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7.  Conclusions1.  INTRODUCTION
In their comprehensive survey of the distribution of wealth Davies and Shorrocks
1 describe
some stylized facts about personal wealth holdings known for various countries:
(1) The distribution of wealth is more unequal than that of income, and has a long upper tail.
(2) Many households never accumulate much private wealth, even in rich countries.
(3) Wealth inequality has been on a downward trend for most of the past century but with
interruptions and reversals.
(4) Financial assets are less unequally distributed than non-financial assets, at least when
owner-occupied housing is the major component of non-financial assets.
(5) The distribution of inherited wealth is much more unequal than that of wealth in general.
(6) The age-wealth pattern is much less pronounced than predicted by the life cycle hypothe-
sis.
2
In this survey information about the distribution of wealth in Germany is very scarce.
Only two studies are cited: One by Börsch-Supan referring to 1983, and another one by
Burkhauser, Frick and Schwarze referring to 1988.
3 Davies and Shorrocks neglected some
earlier studies written in German, presumably because of language problems.
4
Our paper presents cross-section results for the period from 1973 to 1998 based on the
Income and Consumption Surveys (ICS) (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe) of the
                                                   
1 Davies and Shorrocks (2000), pp. 607 and 663.
2 An earlier survey by Wolff (1991) drew similar conclusions.
3 Davies and Shorrocks (2000), Table 1, p. 637.
The paper by Burkhauser et al. (1997) is based on the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP). There are
methodological differences with respect to the analysis of the concentration of wealth between the Burkhauser et
al. paper and our study. The most important differences are: (1) Burkhauser et al. use persons as the units of
measurement. To derive Gini coefficients for disposable wealth of persons household wealth is divided by the
sum of the weights of the household members based on the original OECD equivalence scale. We use either the
household or persons as units of measurement. If persons are used household wealth is divided by the number of
members without weighting. (2) Burkhauser et al. calculate the Gini coefficient and the quintile shares based on
a ranking according to the net equivalent income of each person. Persons with zero or negative income are ex-
cluded. Our ranking is based on disposable wealth, and all households or persons with zero disposable wealth or
negative disposable wealth are included when decile shares are computed. For calculating Gini coefficients units
with negative disposable wealth are set to zero. In general,  the method used by Burkhauser et al. leads to lower
values of the Gini coefficient, and to a much higher share of wealth of the lowest quintile.
4 Ring (2000, pp. 200-252) gives an overview of earlier studies.2
German Federal Statistical Office.
5 We examine whether the summary of facts given by
Davies and Shorrocks can be corroborated for Germany. Additionally, we analyze more
closely to what extent the reunification of Germany and the change of the economic system
in East Germany from a socialist economy with a dominance of state ownership of
enterprises, land and housing to a Western type welfare state is reflected in the distribution of
personal wealth.
We restrict the analysis to the conventional concept of marketable household wealth
which we call -- following the terminology used by Wolff -- household disposable wealth.
6
The unit of measurement is either the household and its disposable wealth or the person with
its disposable wealth calculated per household member.
The paper is organized as follows:
At first, we describe main characteristics of our data sources, and we briefly report
some aggregate figures of household wealth as estimated by the Deutsche Bundesbank,
which include wealth holdings of non-profit organizations. The next three sections are
restricted to West Germany for which we can construct a time series from 1973 to 1998. We
present measures of the level and the overall trend of the inequality of household disposable
wealth and household disposable income as well as equivalent disposable income of persons.
Then we deal with inequality in the distribution of financial assets and housing as the two
main components of disposable wealth of the vast majority of households. In the next section
we look at average disposable wealth of age groups, and its dispersion. Additionally, we
construct two pseudo cohorts to distinguish between age and cohort effects. Following a brief
introduction to the main institutional changes that accompanied German reunification we
analyze the distribution of disposable wealth and its components in East Germany in the final
                                                   
5 Although there are some other data sources a cross-section time series can only be constructed from the
Income and Consumption Surveys. There is a good chance that this time series can be continued in the near
future because data from a new Income and Consumption Survey (ICS) referring to 2003 will become available
by the end of 2004. Furthermore, in 2002 the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) conducted a special high
income and wealth survey the data of which will become available for analysis by the end of 2003 (see Schupp
and Wagner 2003). While the GSOEP data can be used anywhere by the international research community on a
contractual basis, micro-data of the German Federal Statistical Office presently can only be analyzed within
Germany due to legal restrictions. For a comparison of  the GSOEP with the ICS see Becker et al. (2003).
6 Wolff (1991, p. 94) describes household disposable wealth as including “assets and liabilities that have a
current market value and that are directly or indirectly marketable (fungible). A typical list of assets includes
owner-occupied housing and other real estate; consumer durables and household inventories; cash checking and
savings accounts; bonds, and other financial instruments; corporate stocks or shares; the equity in
unincorporated businesses; trust funds; and the cash surrender value of life insurance policies and pension
plans.” It has to be noted, however, that the following results for Germany generally neglect consumer durables.
Additionally, equity in private businesses is not included in most years. Traded stocks are included in financial
assets at market value.3
section. We conclude by arguing that wealth inequality may increase further because of the
present retrenchment policy.
2.      MICRO-DATA AND WEALTH HOLDINGS OF THE HOUSEHOLD SECTOR
The Income and Consumption Survey (ICS) of the Federal Statistical Office of Germany has
been conducted at five-year intervals since 1962/1963. It is a quota sample of between 45,000
to 60,000 households who participate voluntarily.
7 At first, it centered mainly on
demographic characteristics and on income and expenditure. Later on, it also included the
assets of private households. This survey places a great burden on the sample households
because they have to answer to several interviews and to do book keeping of all incomes and
expenditures up to a year. Since participation rates differ the Federal Statistical Office adjusts
the survey weights to marginal distributions of a mandatory random 1 percent sample of the
resident population in Germany, the Micro Census. Additionally, top coding is applied
8. The
institutionalized population and the homeless are excluded. Households with a foreign head
are only included since 1993 but it is assumed that only the better integrated foreigners are
represented. In 1973 and in 1983 tax values of equity in private businesses were reported,
which had to be adjusted to market value. Marketable stocks are included in financial assets.
The surveys of 1993 and 1998 contain market prices of houses and land as estimated by the
owners but for previous years only much lower tax values were given that had to be adjusted
to market values. For scientific analyses only random sub-samples of between 80 percent and
98 percent of the total sample are available. It is also well known that assets are usually
underreported in surveys. These shortcomings of the ICS lead to a downward bias of
measured inequality of disposable household wealth, and they to some extent also limit
comparability over time.
                                                   
7 The main characteristics of the ICS and the procedures used to calculate the inequality measures for household
disposable wealth are summarized in the appendix.
8 The cut-off points referring to monthly net income of households were DM 15,000 in 1973, DM 20,000 in
1978, DM 25,000 in 1983 and 1988, and DM 35,000 DM in 1993 and 1998. As can be derived from Merz‘s
analysis (Merz 2001) based on income tax records households with a monthly net income of more than DM
8,000 are grossly underrepresented in the Income and Consumption Surveys. Merz found that about 270,000
“rich” households were missing from the grossed-up figures of the Income and Consumption Survey 1998. In
the mid-nineties these were about 0.75 percent of all households in unified Germany. The income of
approximately 37,000 of these households exceeded the cut-off line.4
From the ICS we can calculate grossed up values of total disposable wealth of private
households as well as disposable wealth per household and per household member. Table 1
presents the results.
From 1983 to 1998 total disposable wealth has increased from 1,626 in West
Germany to 4,251 billion Euro in United Germany. This means an average growth rate of
around 6.6 percent per year. Partly, this increase is due to the reunification of Germany. If we
restrict the analysis to West Germany the increase is from 1,626 to 3,910 billion Euro, a
growth rate of around 6 percent. During this period the number of households changed
considerably. Therefore, disposable wealth per household increased only from 72,100 to
130,500 Euro, that means a growth rate of 4 percent. If we again restrict the view to West
Germany the rate of growth of disposable household wealth per household was 3.2 percent.
As will be explained in section 6 disposable wealth per household is much higher in West
Germany than in East Germany. In 1993 the West German average was about 3.3 times as
high as the East German average, but until 1998 this ratio had been reduced to 2.6.
To check the reliability of the grossed-up figures for disposable wealth of German
households they could be compared with the respective figures of the national balance sheets.
The German Federal Statistical Office, however, has never produced national balance sheets
for total German wealth, disaggregated by sectors, so that such a comparison is not possible.
The Deutsche Bundesbank published estimates of aggregate wealth for several sectors and for
broad categories of assets but since the figures for the “household sector” include net wealth
holdings of all non-profit organizations (e.g. churches, labor unions, foundations)
comparability is limited. Furthermore, the reference years of the estimates of the Deutsche
Bundesbank do not correspond to the survey years. Table 2 shows what is known for
Germany.
From these figures of the Deutsche Bundesbank one can calculate rough estimates of
total disposable wealth holdings of private households that correspond to the reference years
of the surveys by simple interpolation. If consumer durables are left out and, additionally, 5
percent of wealth is deducted as a rough estimate of the wealth of non-profit organizations
the resulting figures are comparable to the grossed-up figures from the surveys because
equity in private businesses is neither included in the figures of the Deutsche Bundesbank nor
in the grossed-up totals from the surveys. Moreover, the figure of the Deutsche Bundesbank
for 1990 has to be reduced by another 10 percent because it refers to United Germany. These
estimates in billions of Euros are: 2,038 (1983), 2,795 (1988), 4,200 (1993), and 5,0875
(1998). Comparing these estimates with the respective figures in Table 1 one finds that the
ICS figures are between 7 percent and 29 percent lower. Keeping in mind that the top income
and wealth holder group is excluded from the survey and that some assets are underreported
this can be considered an acceptable approximation.
9
3.  INEQUALITY OF DISPOSABLE WEALTH ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS IN WEST
GERMANY FROM 1973 TO 1998
Table 3 presents time series of Gini coefficients for household disposable wealth, household
disposable income and equivalent disposable income of persons. In Germany the Gini
coefficients for household disposable wealth are in the range from 75 percent to 62 percent.
This range lies within the wider range from 79 percent (U.S.) to 52 percent (Japan) as
reported by Davies and Shorrocks referring to the mid-eighties.
We suppose, however, that these estimates for Germany -- with the exception of the
result for 1973 -- are lower bounds of the estimates of the true values because the ICS does
not capture households with very high incomes, most of whom also belong to the group of
top wealth holders.
10, 11
Comparing the Gini coefficients for disposable wealth and disposable income of
households one finds that this measure is much lower for income inequality than for wealth
inequality, with a value of mostly less than a half. When one looks at the Gini coefficient for
equivalent disposable income of persons this measure in all years is approximately one fifth
lower than that for household disposable income, a typical fact shown in many studies of
income distribution. This corroborates for Germany the findings summarized by Davies and
Shorrocks as to the level of inequality of household disposable wealth and household
disposable income. We also presume a long tail of the wealth distribution in Germany but we
cannot give precise quantitative results.
12
Another way of looking at the inequality of disposable wealth is to ascertain the share
of the top 1 percent, top 5 percent, and top 10 percent of households in total disposable
wealth. This is the strategy often used to characterize trends in wealth inequality because only
                                                   
9 The figures for 1973 are a special case because the authors Mierheim and Wicke (1978) had adjusted their
estimates derived from the ICS to national totals. We take these estimates at face value.
10 It should be noted that Burkhauser et al. (1997), who used the German Socio-economic Panel calculated a
Gini coefficient of 69 percent 1988.
11 Only for 1973 Mierheim and Wicke adjusted for missing households and missing assets.
12 See Schupp and Wagner (2003)6
tax figures for the wealthy households are available in some countries (Wolff 1996, Davies
and Shorrocks 2000). Obviously, these measures focus attention on a small segment of the
population, which may be of interest from a certain political point of view. These measures,
however, do not capture the wealth distribution across the entire population that is also
important, especially in Germany, which since several decades enacted a policy of promoting
the spread of wealth holdings among the middle classes.
13 Decile share distributions contain
information for both views. Table 4 presents the decile share distributions for West Germany
from 1973 to 1998.
The lowest decile shows negative disposable wealth. Since the value of consumer
durables is not included consumer loans obviously are higher than available financial assets.
More generally, we can observe that the lowest four deciles possess only a negligible share of
total disposable wealth. This corroborates one of the findings reported for other countries by
Davies and Shorrocks. The middle group consists of the fifth and sixth decile, which both
have shares of total disposable wealth that are still far below their respective population
shares. One has to go up to the seventh decile to see the first one whose share of total
disposable wealth corresponds approximately to its population share. With the top three
deciles the share of total disposable exceeds their population share. The lion’s share of
wealth, however, belongs to the top decile. Remembering that the top group of wealth holders
is not fully covered by the ICS -- except for the year of 1973 -- these figures must again be
considered lower bounds of the estimates of their true shares, which in reality may be slightly
over one half of total disposable wealth in West Germany.
14
Comparing these results for West Germany with figures for several other countries
referring to the mid-eighties that are reported in Wolff (1996) one can gather from Table 5
that the shares of the two bottom quintiles are everywhere extremely low. Slight differences
may be due to the inclusion of some consumer durables in some countries.
In West Germany the share of the third quintile is lowest but the share of the fourth
quintile is highest. There seems to be a broader upper middle class of wealth holders in
Germany than in other countries. This presumption is corroborated by looking at the shares of
the top quintiles. The share of the top quintile is lower in Germany and in Canada than in the
U.S. and in Sweden with Australia somewhere in the middle. This can only be a tentative
                                                   
13 Ring (2000), ch. 9, pp 297-3607
conclusion, however, since in Germany the share of the top quintile is biased downwards as
mentioned before.
When we look at the development of the Gini coefficients in Table 3, and also at the
changes of the shares of the two top deciles in Table 4 it seems that we can ascertain a trend
of decreasing wealth inequality in West Germany for the two decades from 1973 to 1993.
Such a tendency was also found for several other countries, at least for the seventies (Wolff
1996, Davies and Shorrocks 2000). There are, however, several limitations to an
interpretation of these figures at face value. Mierheim and Wicke adjusted their figures for
our first reference year 1973 to national totals. They estimated also the number and the
average disposable wealth of households of the top income group that was neglected in the
ICS, and combined them with the survey results, thus constructing a complete picture of
wealth inequality in Germany.
15 Such extensive adjustments were not made for the other
years.
The Gini coefficient for 1983 in the first row is calculated including the value of
stocks and equity in private businesses but neglecting the wealth holdings of the top wealth
holders not covered by the ICS. This clearly causes a downward bias of the Gini coefficient,
and the share of the top decile.
16 For reason of better comparability with the following years
the Gini coefficient for 1983 in the second row only includes the value of tradable stocks but
excludes equity of private businesses.
The figures for 1983 (second row), 1988, 1993 and 1998 also neglect the top wealth
holders, and, additionally, the equity in private businesses. Only stocks that are traded at the
stock exchange were included. Since it can be assumed that equity in private businesses is
concentrated in the top decile, both these facts contribute to a downward bias of the Gini
coefficients, and of the shares of the top deciles in these years.
In 1993 the ICS for the first time included foreigners living in Germany. In West
Germany they made up around 9 percent of the resident population. Although there are
indications that only the better integrated foreigners participated in the surveys it can be
                                                                                                                                                                  
14 Stein (2003, section 3.1.4.3) estimates that this group of top wealth holders owns about 5 percent of total
disposable wealth. If  this group were included in the ranking it would increase the share of the top decile by
about 4 percent to 5 percent.
15 For details see Mierheim and Wicke (1978), pp.  21-30 and pp. 38-54.
16 Only in 1973 and 1983 the ICS contained the tax value of equity in private businesses. This tax value had to
be converted to market prices by a roughly estimated multiplier.8
assumed that they mostly belonged to the lower wealth deciles.
17 This means that the values
of the Gini coefficient referring to the years 1993 and 1998 -- if restricted to the German
population -- would be somewhat lower than their values for the resident population as shown
in Table 3.
18
It depends on the theoretical question pursued whether one wants to refer to the total
resident population in each year or only to a subset of it in determining the trend in wealth
inequality. We prefer to look at the resident population because in a period of globalization
one can no longer abstract from migration. We consider, therefore, the Gini coefficients for
1983 and 1988, which excluded foreigners, as a little downward biased in addition to the
other biases mentioned.
Given the available evidence, and taking all these arguments into consideration, we
can corroborate only a slight tendency of decreasing inequality of household disposable
wealth from 1983 to 1993. This tendency was reversed from 1993 to 1998. We suppose also a
slight decrease of wealth inequality between 1973 and 1983 but its magnitude is in doubt.
4.  INEQUALITY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF NET FINANCIAL ASSETS AND
NET HOUSING WEALTH ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS IN WEST GERMANY 1983 TO
1998
When one disregards consumer durables and equity in private businesses, then total
disposable household wealth can be split up into net financial assets and net housing wealth.
“Net” means that consumer debts are deducted from the gross sum of financial assets, and
housing debts are deducted from the gross value of housing and real estate. It is interesting to
note that the share of net financial assets in total disposable wealth was about one quarter,
rising from 22.1 percent in 1983 to 27.6 percent in 1998. Correspondingly, the share of the
net value of housing wealth decreased during this period from 77.9 percent to 72.4 percent
despite the fact that the ownership rate for housing wealth increased from 45.5 percent in
1983 to 49.1 percent in 1998 after a high of 50.7 percent in 1993.
19 Thus the ownership rate
                                                   
17 During the eighties and nineties Germany experienced considerable immigration, mostly from non-EU
countries. Net immigration between 1980 and 1990 amounted to about 800,000 persons. Between 1991 and
1997 another 1.5 million persons came into United Germany. The most important groups of immigrants were
family members joining their already present spouses who originally came into the country as so-called guest-
workers, repatriates from former socialist countries, refugees and asylum seekers. In general, these immigrants
came with no or very little wealth. Enquete-Kommission (1998), Table 2, p. 738
18 The Gini coefficients for West Germany excluding foreign households are 61.9 (1993) and 63.5 (1998).
19 Stein (2002), Table 4, p. 11 and Table 6, p. 12. The decrease in the ownership rate of housing wealth between
1993 and 1998 seems to be due to net immigration because immigrants usually are not able to acquire housing
wealth within a short period after immigration for lack of financial assets they bring with them.9
for houses in Germany is far lower than for financial assets of all kinds, which may be over
90 percent, although many households own only small amounts.
For these two broad categories of household wealth we can also ask what is the level
of inequality, and whether this period was characterized by a trend in inequality. Table 6
shows the results.
We can gather from Table 6 that net financial wealth is less unequally distributed than
total disposable wealth except in the last year of our series, 1998. This lower concentration of
financial assets could be expected since households with low disposable wealth usually keep
their assets in the form of bank accounts, savings accounts with banks or housing
associations, or in life insurance plans. Since in Germany the prices of apartments and houses
are rather high compared to average disposable income, and since banks usually finance not
more than 75 percent of the price of a house one needs a large amount as a down payment to
acquire property. This is the main reason why ownership rates of housing are low compared
to other countries. It is not astounding, therefore, that net housing wealth is more unequally
distributed than total disposable wealth.
There was, however, a noticeable trend of decreasing inequality of net housing wealth
from 1983 to 1993, which was reversed after 1993. Inequality of net financial wealth
fluctuated. One has to bear in mind, however, that the boom at the stock market had already
started in 1998 but had not reached its peak. This picture corresponds with the mixed results
reported by Davies and Shorrocks (2000, p. 607) with respect to the inequality of monetary
asset holdings observed in other countries.
5.  INEQUALITY OF WEALTH HOLDINGS BETWEEN AND WITHIN AGE
GROUPS
20
The simple life-cycle model predicts that personal disposable wealth at the beginning of
working life of each birth cohort is zero for all members of a birth cohort, which implies also
                                                                                                                                                                  
Burkhauser et al. (1997, Tab. 5) compare the ownership rates of houses and apartments between Germany and
the US by age group and by gender. At the end of the eighties the overall US rate are about one third higher than
the German rate.
20 We distinguish age groups, i.e. households or household members according to the age of the head of house-
hold, from birth cohorts, i.e. households or members of households with the same year of birth of the head of
household.10
complete equality.
21 In the course of working life wealth is accumulated according to the
possibilities and the willingness to save from unequally distributed earned incomes. Personal
disposable wealth is highest at retirement age, and inequality of the distribution of personal
wealth is also highest. During the retirement period disposable wealth is steadily reduced to
finance consumption, and, therefore, inequality of wealth holdings may also be decreasing.
At the time of death personal disposable wealth is again reduced to zero, and equality of
wealth holdings is restored. To come closer to reality many factors have to be integrated into
this simple life-cycle model. The first factor at the person level is the distribution of earnings
and its determinants. The second factor at the person level are the rates of return for
accumulated wealth, and capital gains or losses. Marriage and divorce behavior, e.g. class
specific mating or random mating, differential fertility and labor market participation of the
spouses that influences the possibility to save are the main factors if one changes from the
person to the family level. The propensity to save may be influenced by the tax system and by
the social protection system, which covers social risks on a broader or smaller scale and with
higher or lower benefits. Uncertainty about expected life time income and about the life span
of the individuals or, in case of a couple of both spouses, introduces the precautionary motive
into the considerations about wealth accumulation and decumulation, and, finally, the bequest
motive and the legal rules for the division of estates among heirs including the motive to
invest in the children’s education and to support their start in life by gifts inter vivo may play
a role, at least for couples with children or close relatives.
22
Elaborated models that include most of these factors often yield inconclusive results
as to the accumulation or decumulation of household wealth after retirement, and the effects
of bequests on the inequality of the wealth distribution. Davies and Shorrocks (2000, p.616)
state in their review “...the broad consensus is that, after the first few years of retirement,
private wealth .... declines in retirement. What remains in considerable doubt is the speed at
which dissaving takes place ...”. In what follows we show some empirical facts for Germany
to check whether they are in line with this view.
                                                   
21 Under the assumption of perfect capital markets with the possibility to borrow on future earnings initial
wealth personal holdings at the beginning of working life would even be negative and debts would be unequally
distributed.
22 For an overview of the relevant factors see Davies and Shorrocks (2000), pp. 608-627.11
Diagram 1 displays for four sample years average levels of disposable wealth of
various age groups of households
23 as proportion of the respective overall average disposable
wealth.
One sees the well-known hump shape. In every ICS sample one middle-aged group
has the highest relative wealth position. But the respective age group is not the same. In the
ICS of 1983 it is the group at the age between 50 and 54 years, and in the ICS of 1998 it is
the group at the age between 60 and 64 years. This points to a cohort effect.
Household size changes over the life course. Therefore, it is interesting to check
whether this shape remains the same if we look at household disposable wealth per household
member. To be comparable to the previous approach all members of a household are
classified according to the age of the head of household irrespective of their own age. From
Diagram 2 we can see much less of a hump. The peak is now at about the same age.
A decrease in relative average wealth holdings is only visible for the age group over
65, the mandatory retirement age in Germany. The ICS of 1993 presents even an exception
because there is no decrease at all. Obviously, this flattening of the hump is the effect of
changing household size, especially in old age, when one spouse dies and leaves most or all
of its personal wealth to the surviving spouse. It seems obvious, that the bequest motive
should not only be discussed with respect to children but also modeled with respect to
surviving spouses to improve the explanatory power of models of wealth accumulation and
distribution.
With a time series of cross-section data one cannot distinguish between the effects of
economic development and changes in the institutional structure, that influence each birth
cohort at a different point in their life courses, and life-course effects, due to the aging of
each individual member of a certain birth cohort. A long time series of cross-section data,
however, makes it possible, to construct pseudo birth cohorts that can be observed for a
certain period of their life course. Such a pseudo birth cohort consists of as many annual birth
cohorts as there are years between the various sample years, on condition that the time
interval between the various samples remains constant. If the cross-section data came from a
random sample, one could assume that one has different random samples of the same pseudo
birth cohort at different points in their life course. The same is true of a quota sample like the
ICS but the results may be biased to some extent. This methodology is not a full substitute for
                                                   
23 The households are classified according to the age of the head of household.12
real panel data with which one can observe the life course of each individual separately, and
can aggregate life courses in any way one likes, but it provides us at least with some tentative
insights if long-running panels are not yet available.
Diagrams 3 shows average wealth holdings of the two pseudo birth cohorts born
between 1924 and 1928, and between 1929 and 1933 in relation to overall average wealth
holdings.
In the first year of our observation period (1983) the heads of households of the
younger birth cohort were at an age of between 50 and 54 years, while heads of households of
the older birth cohort were between 55 and 59 years old. The heads of households of both
pseudo birth cohorts were retired in the last year of the observation period (1998).
24
Referring to disposable wealth per household we can see from Diagram 3 that both
pseudo birth cohorts had reached their best relative position in the first year of the
observation period (1983) at the age between 50 and 60 years. During the entire observation
period their relative wealth position decreased. This relative decrease, however, was rather
small compared to the prediction of the simple life cycle model. In 1998 the average the
wealth holdings per household of the older birth cohort was still at about the overall average,
and average wealth per household of the younger birth cohort was still far above the overall
average. This points to the fact that these cohorts on average could not save as much as the
average household to keep their relative position. But on average there was no dissaving in
monetary terms after retirement. Therefore, it is extremely implausible that both cohorts will
on average run down their disposable wealth to almost zero during the rest of their lives. On
the contrary, several German studies
25 predict high bequests that can be expected by the
younger generation, which in public discussions is often dubbed “the generation of heirs.”
Is this picture the same if we look at the relative position of the members of these two
birth cohorts by calculating it on a per capita basis but still classifying all the household
members according to the age of the head of household?
Looking at the relative wealth position from this perspective we find from Diagram 4
that the younger cohort born between 1929 and 1933 did not fall behind in their relative
position at all but increased it until an age between 65 and 70. This usually is the period of
retirement in which most persons are still healthy and can enjoy their life without work. Only
                                                   
24 Due to limitations of the data in the sample of 1998 the members of the oldest cohort include all households
with an head older than 70 years with no upper age limit. If there exists dissaving with increasing age this biases
average wealth holdings of the “true” birth cohort members downwards.13
the oldest cohort, born between 1924 and 1928, reduced its relative position meaning that
they could not save as much to keep up with average growth of disposable wealth per capita.
Moreover, for both cohorts we do not find an absolute decrease of wealth holdings in
monetary terms. This means that on average there was no dissaving at the person level. The
decrease that was observed at the household level is to a large extent compensated for by
changes in household size, and, presumably, by bequests to surviving spouses. Additionally,
there may exist a selection effect because less wealthy persons seem to die earlier
26 thus
changing the composition of the pseudo birth cohort in favor of the richer group causing an
increase in average wealth holdings. This effect could only be controlled by using data of a
long-running panel. We can conclude, therefore, that in Germany because of the rather well
developed pension system, and social insurance provisions for the cost of nursing in old age,
there is no evidence that birth cohorts on average are running down their disposable wealth to
a great extent.
27 The bequest motive seems to be very strong.
If disposable wealth were completely self-accumulated from current income young
households would possess little wealth, and the distribution of wealth among them would be
rather equal. Inequality would develop during the life course, and it would decrease after
retirement when wealth is run down to finance consumption in old age. Therefore, one can
get some insight into the deviations from this simple hypothesis if one checks the distribution
of disposable wealth within age groups. Table 7 shows the results for West Germany for the
years 1983 and 1998.
In all age groups the distribution of household disposable wealth at the household
level is a little more unequal than at the person level but displays the same pattern. In 1983
inequality was highest within the youngest age group, then it decreased until retirement age,
and finally it increased again.
28 In 1998 inequality within age groups was considerably lower
in every age group than in 1983 but the same pattern emerges. Inequality is highest among
the young households, it decreases until retirement age, and then it increases again. This
pattern is exactly the opposite of what one would expect. If one wants to explain this pattern
one has to look especially at inheritances and gifts inter vivo that some members of the
youngest age group have already received.
                                                                                                                                                                  
25 Hauser and Stein (2001), pp. 147-158; Braun et. al. (2002).
26 See Reil-Held (2000)
27 Similar conclusions for the presently old cohorts are drawn by Börsch-Supan et al. (2003).14
We can only hint at some facts known for West Germany. Based on data from the
GSOEP (wave 1988) Schlomann (1992, Tab. 8.1, p. 248) estimates that 8.5 percent of the
households of the youngest age group had already received inheritances during their life time.
The proportion increases to 14.4 percent of the age group between 30 and 44 years, 21.1
percent of the age group between 45 and 64 years, and is lower again for the oldest cohort
over 65 years. One has to note, however, that the participants of the GSOEP were asked for
inheritances they received since 1960, i.e. during the past 28 years. This would include all of
the inheritances of the youngest age group but to a lesser extent those of the older age groups.
Based on the ICS Stein (2003, Tab. 3.23) finds for 1998 that among the households of the top
decile about 27.5 percent mention that houses or apartments they possess were inherited or
given to them as a gift inter vivo. Among the entire population only 8.9 percent of the
households declare that they have inherited houses or apartments. This is about a fifth of all
homeowners. From this fragmentary information we can derive the tentative conclusion that
inheritances and gifts inter vivo play an important role for overall inequality of disposable
household wealth, especially among the youngest age group.
29 For a considerable group of
the population the so-called original accumulation, i.e. the accumulation of wealth by saving
from own earned income is by far not the only source of the wealth they hold in old age. This
seems especially true for the top wealth holders.
6.  INEQUALITY OF DISPOSABLE HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN EAST AND WEST
GERMANY COMPARED
In 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was founded on the territory the American,
British and French Allied Forces had occupied, and a so-called social market economy was
established. In contrast, the Soviet Government in collaboration with the German Communist
Party established the socialist so-called German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the Soviet
zone. Enterprises and farms were expropriated and transformed to state owned so-called
industrial combinats and agricultural cooperatives. Private property of means of production
was no longer allowed. Larger houses that could be let to renters also became state property
or the property of housing cooperatives. The GDR introduced the system of a planned
                                                                                                                                                                  
28 This picture had to be modified especially for the elderly if their capitalized pension wealth were included in
our definition of household disposable wealth. Inequality within the youngest cohort, however, would not
change very much.
29 Davies and Shorrocks (2000, p. 655) after discussing the various contributions give a rough estimate of the
influence of bequests on wealth holdings to lie between 35 percent to 45 percent.15
economy run by the state authorities and with its own non-convertible currency (Mark, M).
The economy was integrated into the Eastern block. Step by step the border controls were
tightened to stop a continuous flow of emigrants from the GDR to the FRG. In 1962 the
Berlin Wall was erected to close the last loophole for emigration. During the course of the
years the economy of the GDR lagged more and more behind the development in the Western
World, and economic and political difficulties mounted in all the socialist states. It is up to
the historians to exactly gauge the various factors that led to the break down of the Socialist
block. In Germany the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, and within a few days all the
border controls were cancelled. It took only a few month until a Parliament was
democratically elected in the German Democratic Republic that started to transform her
economic and social system. In spring 1990 this Parliament decided to reunite the German
Democratic Republic with the Federal Republic of Germany. The governing bodies of the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Four Powers accepted this decision, and within a few
month a reunification treaty was concluded, detailing how the economic and social system of
the GDR could be transformed to fit the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany
(Grundgesetz) and her social order.
In July 1990 a monetary union was concluded substituting the currency of the GDR
by the Deutsche Mark. Wages and other current incomes as well as prices were converted on
a 1 to 1 basis. Monetary assets and liabilities were converted 2 to 1 with the exception of
savings of M 6,000 per person, which were also converted 1 to 1. Foreign debts of the
German Democratic Republic were to be paid back by united Germany.
30 State property of
the production sector and of land was privatized by a new organization, called
Treuhandanstalt. Contrary to the expectations, this process resulted in a deficit of about 300
billions Deutsche Mark. Land, houses, and companies, which had been expropriated, were
restituted in kind. The West German legal system was introduced including the labor market
regulations, the social protection system, and the tax system. Special regulations guaranteed a
minimum income in case of unemployment and retirement. Very generous early retirement
regulations and special employment measures were also introduced. Despite the 1 to 1
conversion of the currency of the GDR, the wage level amounted to a little less than
50 percent of the West German average wage in 1991. East German pensions were tied to the
East German wage level, and, consequently, were also very low. Although both groups soon
                                                   
30 For the period after reunification we use the terms East Germany and West Germany if we have to distinguish
between the two parts of Germany .16
saw considerable increases of their income in monetary and real terms pensioners gained
more by the change of the old age protection system. During the first half of the 90s West
German financial aid to East Germany increased from 100 billions DM in 1991 to 125
billions DM in 1995. In 1991 these transfers amounted to roughly 4 percent of the West
German but to about 50 percent of the East German Gross Domestic Product. These West-
East transfers were partly channeled through social security system, and partly through direct
transfers from West German to East German budgets. West-East transfers are still continuing
on a large scale, which explains part of Germany’s problems with budget deficits. The
economy in the Eastern part of reunited Germany is still lagging far behind in productivity
and income growth. It may take another 20 years until the discrepancy between the Eastern
and the Western parts of Germany will be reduced to a politically negligible difference.
It does not come as a surprise that the transformation from the socialist system of the
GDR to a social market economy in East Germany had serious consequences for the
distribution of disposable household wealth, not only at the time of reunification but also for
a long time to come.
31 As can be gathered from Table 1 disposable wealth per household in
1993 was 126,600 Euro in West Germany compared to 38,400 Euro in East Germany. From
1993 to 1998 the gap between West and East German households was somewhat reduced in
relative terms but in 1998 West German households still owned about 2.6 times the amount
of East German households.
Table 8 compares the Gini coefficients for disposable wealth, disposable household
income and equivalent disposable income of persons between East and West Germany in
1993 and 1998.
We see again that inequality of the distribution of disposable household wealth is
much greater than inequality of disposable incomes of households or equivalent disposable
incomes of persons. Surprisingly, the distribution of disposable wealth of households is more
unequal in East Germany than in West Germany but the distribution of disposable household
income and of equivalent disposable income of persons is less unequal. While in East
Germany inequality of disposable wealth was decreasing from 1993 to 1998 it was increasing
in West Germany. Household disposable income as well as equivalent disposable income
                                                   
31 In comparing East and West Germany one can look either at the population resident in the former GDR in
1989 irrespective of the residence at the time of the survey (principle of origin) or one can look at the population
resident on the territory of the former GDR (principle of territory). This makes a difference if there is consider-
able migration  between the two parts of Germany which still is the case. In what follows we stick to the princi-
ple of territory.17
became considerably more unequal in East Germany while inequality in West Germany
increased only very little. On all counts, therefore, we can see a tendency of convergence.
Table 9 presents the decile shares of household disposable wealth. In East Germany
the top decile lost while the fifth to the ninth decile increased their shares. In West Germany
only the three top decile gained while all the lower deciles lost.
It is interesting to look also at the distribution of the two main components of
disposable wealth, net financial wealth and net housing wealth.
Table 10 shows that inequality of net financial wealth has increased more in East
Germany than in West Germany, and that it has come close to the West German level. A
much greater discrepancy exists with net housing wealth although there is also a slight
tendency of convergence. Differences in the distribution of net housing wealth seem to be the
main reason for greater inequality of disposable household wealth in East Germany. This can
be explained by a much lower proportion of house and land owners in East Germany
32, and a
tremendous rise of land prices after unification when land and house prices were no longer
fixed by the Government at a very low level but market prices were allowed.
Since ownership of means of production, especially equity in private businesses and
large land holdings, were not allowed in the former German Democratic Republic, and,
therefore, could not be inherited or received as gifts inter vivo, one could hypothesize that the
distribution of disposable wealth among age groups would be much closer to the life cycle
model than in West Germany. Table 11 shows that this hypothesis cannot be supported.
In East Germany inequality within all age groups is on a higher level than in West
Germany but with a similar pattern. We find highest inequality among the group of young
households, decreasing with age until retirement age, and then increasing again. From 1993
to 1998 inequality among the youngest age group even increased in both parts of Germany
but more so in the East than in the West. For the older age groups one finds a convergence in
inequality. One decade after unification the East German pattern of household wealth
distribution within and between age groups has mostly converged to that of West German.
Obviously, a tendency of convergence between East and West Germany cannot only be found
at the macro level of GDP per capita but also from various perspectives of inequality
                                                   
32 In 1993 the proportion of home owner households in East Germany was only 27.4 percent compared to 50.7
percent in West Germany.  Until 1998 it increased to 33.9 percent in East Germany while it fell in West Ger-
many to 49.1 percent. (Hauser/Stein 2001, p.120). While in the former German Democratic Republic it was very
difficult to keep up houses which resulted in a deterioration of the buildings land kept its value.18
analysis. The consequence of narrowing the gap in GDP per capita is more inequality of the
distributions of income but less inequality of wealth.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The results presented show that the inequality of the distribution of household disposable
wealth is somewhere in the middle of industrialized countries. Inequality has decreased
slightly from 1973 to 1993, and then increased again. East German inequality of the
distribution of disposable household wealth and of disposable household income is
converging to the West German levels although from different starting points. For United
Germany we can expect an increase in inequality of disposable household wealth for three
reasons: First, since a further retrenchment of the welfare state is under way this will force
the long-term unemployed, the prematurely disabled, and early retirees to run down their
household wealth for consumption during their working life thus increasing the proportion of
households with little or no wealth holdings. Second, it will make it more difficult for those
with reduced social transfers to accumulate wealth. Third, the inheritances due during the two
decades to come will be much larger than in earlier years, and they will be distributed more
unequally because the number of heirs within families is considerably smaller than in former
times due to the decrease in birth rates. We can also expect that political decisions under
discussion, like a reduction of the highest marginal tax rate, a permanent abolition of the
former wealth tax, a further loosing of the taxation of the returns of capital, and a reduction of
the inheritance tax will increase this trend to more wealth inequality in Germany.19
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Appendix: Characteristics of the Income and Consumption Surveys (ICS) of the
German Federal Statistical Office
33
1.1. General information
Year ICS 1983 ICS 1988 ICS 1993 ICS 1998
Type of survey repeated cross-section (no panel)
Sampling method quota sample based on the mandatory random Micro Census
(Micro Census = 1 per cent survey of all inhabitants)
Household definition income sharing unit
Definition of reference
person (household head) person with the highest income
Sample size (households) 44,500 45,000 50,000 62,300
Intended number of
households 54,900 57,400 69,700 73,900
Coverage of intended
number of households 81 % 78 % 72% 84%
Willingness to participate
Less willing to participate are:
- self-employed, farmers, workers
- single-person households




with foreign heads no yes
Grossed up number of
persons covered
(in 1,000)







Weights derived from marginal distributions of the obligatory and
random Micro Census for each federal state based on household




- East- and West-Germany
- Federal States (Länder)
a) Statistisches Bundesamt (1995): Statistisches Jahrbuch 1995 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden,
p. 46.
b)  Statistisches  Bundesamt  (2000):  Datenreport  1999.  Herausgegeben  vom  Statistischen  Bundesamt  in
ZU.S.mmenarbeit mit dem Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung und dem Zentrum für Umfra-
gen, Methoden und Analysen, Mannheim, Wiesbaden, p. 27.
c) Statistisches Bundesamt (2002), Datenreport 2002 p. 29
                                                   
33 German title: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS)23
Year ICS 1983 ICS 1988 ICS 1993 ICS 1998
Size of households cov-





- households with very high monthly net incomes
Cut-off line for house-
holds with very high
monthly net incomes
DEM 25,000 DEM 35,000
Size of the sub-sample
used for analysis
(percent of the original
sample)
98% 80%
Size of the sub-sample
used for analysis (num-
ber of households)
42,752 43,730 40,230 49,720
Size of the sub-sample
used for analysis (num-
ber of persons)
118,367 116,606 104,837 128,02224
1.2 Wealth components reported in the ICS
Year ICS 1983 ICS 1988 ICS 1993 ICS 1998
Components of wealth
gross property wealth (real estates and houses)
+ gross monetary wealth (including quoted shares)
- liabilities in form of consumer debt and housing debts
= net total wealth
Collection of wealth data
(monetary wealth) end of the year during the year
Collection of wealth data
(property wealth) end of the year beginning of
the year
Collection of wealth data
- wealth data are collected on a voluntary basis
- households with the highest incomes are not included in the data




































- life insurance (by contract vol-
ume and age of the reference
person)
- giro accounts (by income po-
sition, ownership of property











Consumer debt etc. recorded25
Year ICS 1983 ICS 1988 ICS 1993 ICS 1998
Property assets
Ratable value for taxa-
tion of property assets recorded
Market values of prop-
erty assets
calculation by means of a con-
version factor on the basis of the
ratable value for taxation of
property assets. The aim is to
adapt the taxation values of
















value of wealth compo-
nents only partly re-
corded
The ownership of wealth com-
ponents is recorded in some
cases – but not the market value.
These values are estimated by
income position, ownership of
property wealth, age of refer-
ence person and number of per-





















Disposable wealth of private households in Germany from 1983 to 1998 based on the Income
and Consumption Surveys
- recalculated in Euro -
Year 1983 1988 1993 1998
Total disposable wealth
of households
(in billions of Euro)
-  West Germany
-  East Germany














 household (in Euro)
-  West Germany
-  East Germany














 person (in Euro)
-  West Germany
-  East Germany













Notes: n.a. = not available
Disposable wealth includes gross monetary assets (including quoted shares) and gross hous-
ing wealth less consumer debts and debts for housing construction. Consumer durables and
equity in private businesses are not included. Mierheim/Wicke (1978, p. 199) estimated eq-
uity of private businesses together with quoted shares to be about 10 % of gross total assets.
Source: Calculations based on the Income and Consumption Surveys of the German Federal
Statistical Office. Anonymized versions of these surveys were made available to the Chair of
Economics, especially Social Policy and Distribution, at the University of Frankfurt am Main
by the German Federal Statistical Office. Official exchange rate: 1 Euro = 1.95583 DM27
Table 2
Disposable wealth of the household sector in Germany from 1980 to 1997
1) 2)
-  recalculated in billions of Euro -
- 


































Disposable wealth 1,983 4,197 5,135 6,182
Notes:
1) Figures for 1990, 1993 and 1997 refer to unified Germany.
2) Disposable wealth of the household sector includes net wealth of non-profit organizations.
3) Housing (replacement costs less depreciation) and proportional ownership of real estate
   Equity in private businesses is excluded.
4) Evaluated at replacement costs less depreciation.
5) Includes securities evaluated at current prices and traded shares.
6) Includes consumer debts and debts for housing construction.
Sources: a) Deutsche Bundesbank (1993), p. 31 and b) Deutsche Bundesbank (1999), p. 43.
Official exchange rate: 1 Euro = 1.95583 DM28
Table 3
The distribution of disposable wealth and disposable income across households and equiva-
lent disposable income across persons in West Germany from 1973 to 1998
- Gini coefficients in percent -
Coverage of
population
German households only Resident population
including foreigners







































Notes: All the results are based on the Income and Consumption Surveys of the German Federal Statistical Of-
fice. For the years 1983 to 1998 they are based on anonymized versions of these surveys which are made avail-
able to the Chair of Economics, especially Social Policy and Distribution, at the University of Frankfurt am
Main by the German Federal Statistical Office. Disposable wealth of households does not include consumer
durables. Furthermore, some components are missing in some years due to data restrictions. For details see text
and appendix.
Gini coefficients were calculated by setting negative disposable wealth holdings of certain households to zero.
1) Mierheim and Wicke (1978), pp. 58-59
2) Schlomann (1992), pp. 136-139
3) Stein (2003), Table 3.19. This figure is derived by excluding equity in private businesses and by reducing the
   multiplier for correcting the tax value of housing to market prices.
4) Hauser (2003), Table 7.1
5) Special calculations by Irene Becker from the micro-data sets available at the University of Frankfurt
6) Hauser (2003), Table A.1, p. 25. To adjust for household size the original OECD equivalence scale was used
    which assigns a weight of 1.0 to the first adult of a household, weights of 0.7 to additional members who are
    15 years or older, and weights of 0.5 to younger children.29
Table 4
The distribution of household disposable wealth in West Germany 1973 - 1998
-  Decile shares in percent -
Coverage of
population















































































Notes: All the results are based on the Income and Consumption Surveys of the German Federal Statistical Of-
fice. Disposable wealth of households does not include consumer durables. Furthermore, some components are
missing in some years due to data restrictions. For details see text and appendix.
1) Mierheim and Wicke (1978), pp. 58-59; only quintile shares available.
2) Schlomann (1992), pp. 136-139
3) Hauser/Stein (2001), pp. 112 and 12430
Table 5
The size distribution of household wealth in selected countries in the mid-80s
based on household survey data





















































Note: n.a. = not available
Sources: 1) Schlomann (1992), pp. 136-139
2) Wolff, 1996, Table 4, p.447 (abbreviated). For details about the country surveys
from which these figures are derived, see footnotes to Wolff’s Table.31
Table 6
Distribution of net financial wealth and net housing wealth across households in West Ger-
many 1983 to 1998
- Gini coefficients in percent -

















1)  Table 4 only shows the values of the Gini coefficient as calculated by Stein, who made
some corrections for reason of consistency of the time series.
Source: Stein (2003), Table 3.19. Calculations are based on the Income and Consumption
Surveys of the German Federal Statistical Office. Anonymized versions of these surveys
were made available to the Chair of Economics, especially Social Policy and Distribution, at
the University of Frankfurt am Main by the German Federal Statistical Office.32
Diagram 1: Relative wealth position of various 


























































Diagram 2: Relative wealth position of various age 





























































Diagram 3: Average wealth holdings per 
household of birth cohorts 1924-1928 and 1929-
1933 in relation to overall wealth holdings of 














































Diagram 4: Average wealth holdings per 
household member of birth cohorts 1924-1928 
and 1929-1933 in relation to overall wealth 
















































Inequality of household disposable wealth within age groups at the household and at the per-
son level in West Germany 1983 and 1998
- Gini coefficients in percent -
1983
1) 1998
2) Age groups according to the
age of the head of household
Households Persons Households Persons
All age groups
Age group 18-29 years
Age group 30-44 years
Age group 45-64 years






















1)  Schlomann (1992), Tab. 6.15 and 6.16, p. 164; figures are rounded. Household disposable
wealth also comprises equity in private businesses.
2)  Calculations based on the Income and Consumption Surveys of the German Federal Sta-
tistical Office. Anonymized versions of these surveys were made available to the Chair of
Economics, especially Social Policy and Distribution, at the University of Frankfurt am
Main by the German Federal Statistical Office. Household disposable wealth does not in-
clude consumer durables and equity in private businesses.35
Table 8
The distribution of disposable wealth and disposable income across households and house-
hold size-adjusted equivalent disposable income across persons in West and East Germany
1993 and 1998
- Gini coefficients in percent -
Resident
population
East Germany West Germany























Notes: All the results are based on the Income and Consumption Surveys of the German Fed-
eral Statistical Office made available to the Chair of Economics, especially Social Policy and
Distribution, at the University of Frankfurt am Main by the German Federal Statistical Of-
fice. Disposable wealth of households does not include consumer durables. Gini coefficients
were calculated by setting negative disposable wealth holdings of certain households to zero
Source:1) Hauser  (2003), Table 7.1.
2) Hauser (2003), Table A.1
3) Hauser (2003), Table A.1. To adjust for household size the original OECD equiva-
lence scale was used which assigns a weight of 1.0 to the first adult of a household,
weights of 0.7 to additional members who are 15 years or older, and weights of 0.5 to
younger children.36
Table 9
The distribution of household disposable wealth in West and East Germany 1993 and 1998
- Decile shares in percent -
Resident
population
East Germany West Germany


































































Notes: All the results are based on the Income and Consumption Surveys of the German Fed-
eral Statistical Office. Disposable wealth of households does not include consumer durables.
Furthermore, some components are missing in some years due to data restrictions. For details
see text and appendix.
Source: Hauser/Stein (2001), Table 5.3, p. 11237
Table 10
Distribution of net financial wealth and net housing wealth across households in
West and East Germany 1993 and 1998
Gini coefficients in percent
Resident population East Germany West Germany
















Source: Hauser/Stein (2001), Table 5.8. Calculations are based on the Income and Consump-
tion Surveys of the German Federal Statistical Office. Anonymized versions of these surveys
were made available to the Chair of Economics, especially Social Policy and Distribution, at
the University of Frankfurt am Main by the German Federal Statistical Office.38
Table 11
Inequality of household disposable wealth within age groups of households
in East and West Germany 1998
- Gini coefficients in percent -
Resident population East Germany West Germany
Year 1993 1998 1993 1998
All age groups
Age group 18-29 years
Age group 30-44 years
Age group 45-64 years






















Calculations based on the Income and Consumption Surveys of the German Federal Statisti-
cal Office. Anonymized versions of these surveys were made available to the Chair of Eco-
nomics, especially Social Policy and Distribution, at the University of Frankfurt am Main by
the German Federal Statistical Office. Household disposable wealth does not include equity
in private businesses and consumer durables.